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1. Two modes of fallacious argument
Professor Dufour pointed out that the terms “fallacy” and “sophism” are often treated as
synonyms and that the same holds for the obsolete French term fallace and the current French
term sophisme. But he pointed out as well that there is also a tendency to make a distinction
between the two terms: the terms “sophism” and “sophisme” would in contradistinction to
“fallacy” imply or at least suggest that there is an intention to deceive one’s interlocutor. I agree
that if one wants to stress that there is, or may be, an intention to deceive one could use the term
“sophism” but if one, on the other hand, wants to stress that there is or may be no such intention
the term “fallacy” seems to me not suited for the job: one would rather speak of an error in
reasoning or in argumentation; the term “fallacy” would be more suitable as a term that equally
covers sophisms and errors.
In German there are two terms for fallacies in reasoning: Trugschluss, which, I would say,
suggests an intention to deceive and Fehlschluss, which suggests the lack of intention. Thus
Trugschluss would correspond to “sophism in reasoning” and Fehlschluss to “error in
reasoning.” But we saw in Dufour’s paper that Kant used the term Trugschluss as a covering
term for fallacies in syllogistic reasoning, and the term Sophisma for sophisms, and
Paralogismus for errors in syllogistic reasoning. The choice of terms may differ, but the
distinction between two kinds of fallacy based on the presence of an intention to deceive is
clearly present in Kant, even though the application of the terms is restricted to syllogistic
reasoning.
When, in his Section 3, Dufour proposes his own terminology for the distinction, he
speaks indiscriminately of “fallacious argument” and “fallacious reasoning.” If “argument” were
here to be taken in the sense of “reasoning,” this would imply that only fallacies of reasoning are
taken into account. But not all fallacies in argumentation are cases of fallacious reasoning; for
example, Straw man, Many Questions, and are Shifting the Burden of Proof are not, and these
are precisely kinds of fallacies that one could expect to be used with an intention to deceive.
Ultimately, Dufour opts for “Fallacious argument” as his covering term, and this seems to me the
better choice because thus the fallacies that do not directly regard the reasoning are included.
Even better would be to use the term “fallacy” itself as a covering term, or else the longer term
“fallacious move in argumentation.”
Fallacious arguments, according to Dufour, may either be deliberate (normally with an
intention to deceive) or non-deliberate. In the first case Dufour speaks of “Sophisms,” in the
second case of “Fallacies.” The choice of the latter term for non-deliberate fallacious arguments
is in my opinion infelicitous; for, now not all fallacious arguments will be fallacies, which quite
deviates from ordinary parlance. Therefore, I would prefer to speak of “erroneous moves in
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argumentation” or “errors.” However, in this commentary I shall stick to the terminology
introduced by Dufour and stick to “fallacy” for errors and “sophism” for the deliberate cases.
2. Frequency
Dufour assumes that any type of fallacious argument may occur deliberately or not, i.e., of each
type there are both sophisms and fallacies. The question is, for each type, how often it occurs as a
sophism in comparison with its occurrences as a fallacy. Dufour argues that the relative
frequency of some kinds of sophism may be low because in the “heat of dialogue” it would be
hard to produce them. Dufour is right that it may depend on the type of fallacious argument
whether it can easily be used as a sophism.
But for some types of fallacious moves in argumentation it seems not so difficult. When
analyzing a Dutch televised political debate between a Minister and a union leader, occurring in
1991, I discovered that the debaters and the presenter together produced a fallacious move
(“committed a fallacy”) every two minutes (Krabbe, 1993). One cannot look into peoples’ minds,
but for each of the 26 fallacious moves that occurred, there is little doubt that the perpetrator (1)
could be supposed to be in some sense aware of the fallacious character of the move, but (2)
even so deliberately argued the way he did, and moreover (3) did so argue with an intention to
deceive. So there were plenty of sophisms in this debate. Some of them seemed to be part of a
premeditated strategy.
Of course, one can never be sure. But then, does it really matter, for argumentation
theory, whether the fallacious moves were put forward deliberately or not? A non-deliberate
fallacious move can be as deceptive as a deliberate one. Perhaps the distinction between
fallacious moves that are deceptive and those that are not is more of a subject that deserves
attention than the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate fallacious moves.
3. Equivocation
Fallacious moves based on ambiguity may or may not be performed deliberately, i. e., they may
occur as sophisms or as fallacies. Merely using an ambiguous term does not suffice to produce a
fallacious move; for practically all terms are somewhat ambiguous. What produces fallacious
moves is the exploitation of these omnipresent ambiguities. To unmask an argument as exploiting
an ambiguity one can make use of the strategy of introducing a distinction (distinguo! see
Mackenzie, 1988).
According to Dufour a necessary condition for unmasking a homonymy is the latter’s
public acknowledgement. One may agree, but the question is which public is to acknowledge that
there are two (or more) meanings of a certain term in play and when is this public to
acknowledge this fact? It need not be the case that the two meanings are listed in the dictionaries
and were in that sense publicly acknowledged before the fallacious move occurred. It could be
that no one had thought of these two meanings before and that they are just introduced in the
distinguo-move itself. The public may be restricted to those present and the acknowledgement
may occur only after the ambiguity has been pointed out.
Let us call those ambiguities that do not rest on two different meanings that are found in
the dictionaries or are commonly known to users of language “subtle ambiguities.” By subtle
ambiguities one may fool less ignorant victims than young Clinias. Even so, equivocation
remains a risky business because of the distinguo-move.
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4. Petitio
Dufour rightly notices that the basic petitio (p therefore p) does not constitute an error of
reasoning and that, in various contexts, it can be used successfully to get certain messages across.
Referring to such contexts, Dufour speaks of “a sophism which conceals a better reason” and of
“a highly successful cooperative sophism.” So would there be there nothing wrong with such
cases of petitio? The use of the term “sophism” by Dufour implies that he considers the petitio in
such cases as a fallacious argument, even though there is no error in reasoning. This fallacious
argument is put forward deliberately, with a particular intention, but the intention is not the usual
one: to deceive; rather it is the intention to get a particular message across. Thus there are
sophisms without an intention to deceive.
I agree that the petitio, even though it is not an error in reasoning and often successful in
communication, is still a fallacious move in argumentation: it does not advance the
argumentative process, and if condoned could lead to infinite regress. Each use of petitio is,
according to Dufour’s terminology, a sophism or a fallacy. That means that using a petitio is no
good from the perspective of argumentation but that does not exclude that it couldn’t be good
from some other point of view.
5. Non causa pro causa
A difficulty for us to assess this type of argument is that, in contemporary logic, it is no longer a
fallacy in an reductio if one does not use the hypothesis or assumption to be refuted for the
derivation of the contradiction (nor would it be a fallacy in a Conditional Proof to leave the
hypothesis or assumption unused).
Dufour’s example starts from the hypothesis to be refuted (the non causa proposition):
“In ten years the oil price will be high.” To derive a contradiction no use is made of this
hypothesis but some other premises are really used. In the first of these, there could be an
ambiguity about whether “up to now” includes the present. The example will be clearer if we
leave this phrase out and formulate the first real premise as: “When the oil price is low there is
no serious research on alternative kinds of energy.” We may suppose that such a premise has
been obtained by induction. The other real premises are “The oil price is low” and “There is
serious research on alternative kinds of energy.” From this one may validly conclude to a
contradiction. We may agree, then, with Aristotle that such an argument is not absolutely
inconclusive.
In Dufour’s example, the fallacious move to the denial of the hypothesis is not, I think, an
inductive one, but a deductive move starting from the fact that a contradiction (or an
impossibility, or known falsehood) has been reached: since a contradiction has been shown to
follow from the premises, one of the latter must be false. But which one? Blaming a hypothesis
that hasn’t even been used (and therefore is not a real premise) would, according to Aristotle, be
a fallacious move. But contemporary (classical and some deviant monotonic) logics would allow
such a move and agree that not only a contradiction but also the denial of the unused hypothesis
has been shown to follow from the real premises. This accords with their acceptance of the (nonAristotelian) ex falso principle.
I agree with Dufour that the structure of non causa is rather complicated, which could
inhibit its use as a sophism. On the one hand knowledgeable opponents will not be fooled: either
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because they adhere to a contemporary brand of logic that does not recognize non causa as a
fallacy or because they know the conditions for a correct Aristotelian reductio. On the other hand
many of the ignorant will be too ignorant even to be fooled as they have no understanding of
how a reductio, Aristotelian or not, works. Only those whose degree of knowledge lies
somewhere in the middle can be fooled, i.e., they may accept the denial of the hypothesis without
renouncing any of the real premises.
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